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Postmodern Media Criticism in a  
Post-Racial World
Christopher P. Campbell
After the 2014 fatal shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed 18-year-old 
African American man, by a White police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, 
some news organizations included in their immediate coverage a photo of 
Brown taken from his Facebook page. In a now iconic image, Brown stands 
in a Nike tank top, unsmiling, and flashing a peace sign (misidentified by 
some news organizations as a gang sign). Later, less incendiary photos 
from Brown’s Facebook page surfaced. Within a few days of Brown’s 
death, the hashtag #IfTheyGunnedMeDown appeared on social media. 
Young African Americans posted two photos of themselves, representing 
positive and potentially negative images, questioning which photo would 
be used by the media if they were shot by police. These posts reflected 
an insight into the notion of media representation that likely escapes 
most audience members who regularly view news coverage of Black men. 
These young African Americans perceptively and concisely identified the 
problems inherent in dominant media representations of Black men as 
pathological criminals, a persistent representation that affects both racial 
attitudes and public policy decisions.
Stuart Hall, whose work on race and representation influenced a gen-
eration of critical media scholars, had died only a few months before 
the Ferguson shooting. He would have quickly recognized the meaning 
of these postings. His work challenged the “preferred reading” of media 
texts; he described the cultural power of analyzing those meanings as the 
“politics of signification” (1980, p. 138). In this chapter, I will describe 
the work of Hall and others who have examined race and media through 
the lens of representation to show how media texts generate powerful 
meanings about African Americans and other people of color. Second, 
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I will argue that the #IfTheyGunnedMeDown posts are consistent with a 
body of work in media studies that has largely failed to effect change in 
media representations of people of color. Finally, I will ask whether social 
media or other pop culture texts have the potential to shift the discussion 
to an audience beyond the academy.
Media Representation and Race
Hall used the term representation to describe the complex ways in which 
the mass media both present images and re-present images that have mul-
tiple meanings, especially about race and ethnicity. For Hall, the analysis 
of media representations is key to unlocking the power of the dominant 
meanings—meanings that indirectly serve the interests of the wealthiest 
and most powerful members of a society. His notion of representation is 
transformational and
a way of constantly wanting new kinds of knowledges to be pro-
duced in the world, new kinds of subjectivities to be explored and 
new dimensions of meaning which have not been foreclosed by 
the systems of power which are in operations. 
(Jhally, 1997)
As John Fiske explained, “The definition of culture as a constant site of 
struggle between those with and those without power underpins the most 
interesting current work in cultural studies” (1992, p. 292). He called 
Hall’s seminal essay, Encoding/Decoding, a “turning point” in cultural 
studies, because it “introduces the idea that television programs do not 
have a single meaning but are relatively open texts, capable of being read 
in different ways by different people and suggests that “there is a neces-
sary correlation between people’s social situations and the meanings that 
they may generate from a television program” (p. 292).
Hall (1980) described decoding media texts through two levels of 
analysis. Simply put, the first level is the denotative or preferred reading—
that which was intended by the producer—and the connotative (negotiated 
and/or oppositional) readings of the same message. What Hall would 
describe as a negotiated reading of media texts allows for analysis beyond 
the meaning intended by their producers. According to Hall, such read-
ings require a recognition of the dominant ideology at work and how that 
ideology is “shot through with contradictions” (1980, p. 137). Hall wrote, 
“Negotiated codes operate through what we might call particular or situ-
ated logics: and these logics are sustained by their differential and unequal 
relation to the discourses and logics of power” (p. 137). In this way, the 
denotative, commonsense meanings of the stories can only be understood 
within the context provided by connotative, interpretive readings.
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Hall ultimately described oppositional readings of media messages in 
which audiences resist the preferred meaning and recognize deeper, prob-
lematic meanings. As Hall said, “One of the most significant political 
moments . . . is the point when events which are normally signified and 
decoded in a negotiated way begin to be given an oppositional reading. 
Here the ‘politics of signification’—the struggle in discourse—is joined” 
(p. 138). Fiske and Hartley described this highest level of analysis of 
media messages as that which recognizes the “mythology” or “ideology” 
that hides in the coding of media messages: “This, the third order of sig-
nification, reflects the broad principles by which a culture organizes and 
interprets the reality with which it has to cope” (1978, p. 46).
Other cultural studies scholars have advanced similar notions about rep-
resentation in interpreting media texts. Louis Althusser (1971), for instance, 
described the concepts of hailing and interpellation to explain how media 
messages coax audiences into specific understandings that serve the inter-
ests of the message producers. As Fiske noted, “These terms derive from 
the idea that any language, whether it be verbal, visual, tactile or what-
ever, is part of social relations and that in communicating with someone 
we are reproducing social relationships” (1992, p. 289). Likewise, Antonio 
Gramsci (1971) used the concept of hegemony—the subtle, unseen political, 
social and economic ideology that reflects the interests of the wealthy and 
powerful—to describe the way in which media representations function.
Like Althusser and Gramsci, Roland Barthes was concerned with 
the subtle functioning of hegemony. In his seminal work Mythologies 
(1957/1972), Barthes described his efforts to examine French society 
through the prism of cultural myths:
The starting point of these reflections was usually a feeling of impa-
tience at the sight of the “naturalness” with which newspapers, art 
and common sense constantly dress up a reality which, even though 
it is the one we live in, is undoubtedly determined by history . . . I 
hate seeing Nature and History confused at every turn, and I wanted 
to track down, in the decorative display of what-goes-without-say-
ing, the ideological abuse which, in my view, is hidden there. 
(p. 11, emphasis in original)
Barthes was concerned with how artifacts of popular culture—advertising, 
photojournalism, studio wrestling, and others—reflected a kind of group-
think that doesn’t allow for more complicated interpretations of events. 
Similarly, Clifford Geertz argued that “as a frame for thought, common 
sense is as totalizing as any other . . . It pretends to reach past illusion to 
truth, to, as we say, things as they are” (1983. p. 84).
Cultural studies scholars have frequently addressed the notion of rep-
resentation in news coverage, which routinely reflects mythical common 
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sense about the events of the day. Fiske and Hartley (1978) identified “myth 
chains” as one of the ways in which journalistic storytelling embeds ideo-
logical understandings, and they argued that “news reporting and fiction 
use similar signs because they naturally refer to the same myths in our cul-
ture” (p. 65). Himmelstein (1984) identified the “myth of the puritan ethic” 
(p. 205) in news coverage that routinely extolled the values of hard work 
and middle-class life while implicitly questioning the values of the under-
class. Richard Campbell (1991a, 1991b), in describing the myth-making 
capacity of journalism, suggested that the notion of “balance” was itself a 
“code word for . . . middle American values.” He continued, “These values 
are encoded into mainstream journalism—how it selects the news, where it 
places its beat reporters, who and how it promotes, how it critically reports 
and thereby naively supports government positions” (1991a, p. 75).
Sociologist Herman Gray (1986, 1991, 1995) has examined racial 
representations in both prime time television programs and journalism 
and identified the “twin representations” of African Americans in fic-
tional and nonfictional television (1986, p. 304), contrasting the upper 
middle-class life portrayed on The Cosby Show with underclass Black 
life portrayed in a contemporaneous PBS documentary, The Vanishing 
Family: Crisis in Black America. Gray argued that race as it was por-
trayed on fictional television was consistent with The American Dream, 
and appealed “to the utopian desire in blacks and whites for racial one-
ness and equality while displacing the persistent reality of racism and 
racial inequality or the kinds of social struggles and cooperation required 
to eliminate them” (1986, p. 302). Gray argued that the underclass Black 
life on nonfictional TV, on the other hand, failed to “identify complex 
social forces like racism, social organization, economic dislocation, unem-
ployment, the changing economy, or the welfare state” in explaining the 
crisis in the urban underclass (p. 300).
Gray concluded that
the assumptions and framework that structure these representa-
tions often displace representations that would enable viewers to 
see that many individuals trapped in the under class have the very 
same qualities (of hard work and sacrifices as seen on Cosby) but 
lack the options and opportunities to realize them. 
(p. 303)
My own work on race and news expands on Gray’s examination of the 
twin representations of African Americans (as well as Hispanic and other 
Americans); in describing my approach in Race, Myth and the News, I 
wrote, “The danger of the commonsense claim to truth is in its exclu-
sion of those who live outside the familiar world it represents” (1995, 
p. 18). My first study (Campbell, 1995) found that the racial mythology 
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embedded in broadcasts across the United States represented “a hegem-
onic consensus about race and class that sustains myths about life outside 
of white, ‘mainstream’ America” (p. 132).
I identified three persistent myths in representations of race in American 
journalism (Campbell, 1995; Campbell et al., 2012). In the “myth of mar-
ginality,” people of color (who are ignored) are less significant and are 
marginalized in news coverage (1995). In the hundreds of newscasts I 
viewed, I observed the general invisibility of people of color in the news, 
including news in cities with large minority populations. Additionally, I 
cited other studies (including Entman, 1990, 1992 and Gist 1990) pro-
viding evidence of the underrepresentation and stereotypical portrayal of 
minorities in all forms of daily news coverage.
Second, I identified a “myth of difference” in local TV newscasts in 
which people of color are routinely represented differently than White 
people. Television news reinforced historical stereotypes about people of 
color, both “positive” stereotypes of successful African American athletes 
and entertainers and negative stereotypes (especially of African American 
and Hispanic men) as violent criminals. I closely analyzed several stories 
that reflected a pattern of subtle racial biases in the newsroom and argued 
that well-intended journalists (and audience members) “are likely una-
ware of the biases and stereotypical thinking that are deeply rooted in the 
cognitive and cultural processes in a society that is dominated by white, 
middle-class perceptions” (p. 82).
Finally, in my analysis of local television news coverage of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Day, I identified a “myth of assimilation,” in which peo-
ple of color, especially African Americans, are shown to have overcome 
racism and become fully assimilated into the American mainstream, where 
equality has been achieved. This is now referred to as post-racialism. 
Stories about the King holiday were dominated by a theme of racial har-
mony, despite the evidence of lingering racial hostility in many of the 
cities adopting that theme. I wasn’t surprised by this; as I wrote:
The social and professional processes that dictate how news is cov-
ered are based on an implicit common sense, a common sense that 
may have more to do with stereotyped notions about the world 
than with a true understanding of it. Most Americans would like to 
believe that their country is a tolerant and fair one, that discrimina-
tion does not exist, that equal opportunity is there for all. But what 
we would like to believe and what actually exists are clearly at odds. 
(1995, p. 111)
I was concerned about news organizations creating a mythical world in 
which racial harmony is the norm while continuing to bombard audi-
ences with stories about people of color suspected of violent crimes. 
C H R I S T O P H E R  P.  C A M P B E L L
200
In reflecting on the work of Gray (1986, 1991) and Jhally and Lewis 
(1992), I noted: “If our society is the just and fair one that was portrayed 
on King Day, the constant barrage of menacing images of minorities that 
more commonly appear on local TV news will undoubtedly fuel racist 
attitudes” (p. 111). When revisiting representations of race on local televi-
sion news in 2012 (Campbell, LeDuff and Brown), we found few changes 
to the myths I had identified in 1995; indeed, the mythic representations 
of race in journalism in the age of the Barack Obama presidency seemed 
even more problematic.
Certainly, the gap between Black and White opportunity in the United 
States has not closed during the Obama era, and the 2007 recession had 
a more dire impact on Black America than on the population at large. 
According to the Economic Policy Institute (2014), the African American 
community suffered a “dramatic increase in unemployment and a stagger-
ing loss of income” during the recession (p. 1). The institute found that 
the median Black household’s income fell 10.1%, compared to 5.4% for 
White households. A few other numbers similarly reflect the disparities: 
Twenty-six percent of Black American families live in poverty; 11% of 
White families live in poverty (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). About 32% 
of White Americans have college degrees; fewer than 19% of African 
Americans have graduated from college (JBHE.com, 2013). Black unem-
ployment is over 11%. White unemployment is 5.4% (Rosen, 2014). 
Joblessness among Black teenagers is nearly 38%; 17% of White teenag-
ers are jobless (PBS Newshour, 2014). African Americans are jailed at a 
rate of six times the rate of Whites (Drake, 2013). African Americans are 
arrested at a rate 10 times higher than people who are not Black (Heath, 
2014). The notion of post-racialism—the belief that America has over-
come its racist legacy—seems preposterous in the face of such statistics, 
although it continues to reflect the attitude of more than half of White 
Americans, who hold “explicit anti-Black attitudes” (Edsall, 2013, p. 1). 
Remarkably, most Whites believe there is more anti-White than anti-Black 
discrimination, which they believe has been “all but eliminated” (Fletcher, 
2015). Although research by media scholars has for decades pointed out 
the penchant for media institutions to provide gross misrepresentations of 
African Americans and other minority populations, there has not been a 
significant change in those misrepresentations in the primary (sometimes 
called “mainstream,” a term now loaded with conflicting political con-
notations) media systems in the U.S.
Race, Media, and Postmodernism
My interest here is in whether the social media posts following Michael 
Brown’s shooting reflect a new postmodern media criticism, moving the 
critique of problematic racial representations into the realm of popular 
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culture, where it is then addressed by traditional news organizations. 
Certainly, this would not be the first time that pop culture has illuminated 
racial attitudes in the United States. As early as the 1960s, comedian 
Richard Pryor pushed the envelope by challenging racial inequities dur-
ing his hilarious but incendiary performances. As Pryor biographer Scott 
Saul noted, “He’s talking about the gap between how [Blacks and Whites] 
travel through the world and perceive it. And people are starting to have 
a conversation through him, this very conversation about racial injustice 
in America” (on Fresh Air, 2014). Satirical television programs in the 
1970s and 1980s—e.g., NBC’s Saturday Night Live and Fox’s In Living 
Color—also ventured into race in a way that mainstream media had not.
Rolling Stone media critic Jon Katz presciently argued in 1992 that 
young Americans were looking to places other than traditional organi-
zations for news and information. He contended that popular music, 
non-news television and the film industry informed America’s youth far 
more than newspapers or TV newscasts did:
Straight news—the Old News—is pooped, confused and broke . . .
In the place of Old News, something dramatic is evolving, a 
new culture of information, a hybrid New News—dazzling, ado-
lescent, irresponsible, fearless, frightening and powerful. The 
New News is a heady concoction, part Hollywood film and TV 
movie, part pop music and pop art, mixed with popular culture 
and celebrity magazines, tabloid telecasts, cable and home video.
Increasingly, the New News is seizing the functions of main-
stream journalism, sparking conversations and setting the coun-
try’s social and political agenda. 
(Katz, 1992, p. 33)
As far as the “New News” and its role in the media discussion about race, 
Katz argued that film director Spike Lee was “far ahead of his mainstream 
competitors on racial issues. So is [rapper] Ice Cube” (p. 35). Although 
Katz’s article significantly pre-dated the advent of social media and did 
not use the term postmodernism, this new means of information dis-
semination reflects a kind of postmodern “New News” on steroids, with 
young people flocking to social media sites to share news and opinions 
about relevant events, including events related to race. Young African 
Americans especially are flocking to Twitter, at a significantly higher rate 
than young Whites (Smith, 2014).
But first a word about postmodernism, a slippery concept at best, and 
one that tends to defy definition as it applies to media studies. For instance, 
Television Quarterly once headlined an article, “‘We Know It When We 
See It’: Postmodernism and Television” (Campbell & Freed, 1993). The 
authors described “PoMo” as “newfangled attitudes about oldfangled 
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ideas” (p. 75) and cautioned about approaching media criticism with a 
postmodern filter: even “trying to define and categorize PoMo style is a 
decidedly logical, rational and modern critical practice—the very essence 
of what postmodernism wants to resist at all turns” (p. 76).
Collins (1992) similarly argued that postmodernism has been employed 
in divergent, contradictory ways, and listed six different applications of 
the term:
(1) a distinctive style; (2) a movement that emerged in the six-
ties, seventies, or eighties, depending on the medium in question;  
(3) a condition or milieu that typifies an entire set of socioeco-
nomic factors; (4) a specific mode of philosophical inquiry that 
throws into question the givens of philosophical discourse; (5) a 
very particular type of “politics”; and (6) an emergent form of 
cultural analysis shaped by all of the above. 
(p. 327)
More recent discussions include the notion of post-postmodernism, 
called automodernity by Robert Samuels (2010), which posits that new 
media herald a new cultural and technological period that empow-
ers individual media users in a way that traditional media have not. 
Baya’s analysis of automodernity noted that this period “transcends 
the initial postmodern diagnosis and requires new perspectives upon 
understanding audiences” (2013, p. 157). He argued that with digital 
communication and the “omnipresence” of media messages, audiences 
spend increasing amounts of time both receiving and producing media 
content. As Baya observed, “The average ‘digital youth’ user simulta-
neously operates his laptop for working, socializing on instant chat or 
on networks such as Facebook, participating in online games, giving 
feedback on blogs and engaging in several other types of electronic con-
versations—multitasking and mixing work with leisure, private with 
public space” (p. 157).
#IfTheyGunnedMeDown
Acknowledging the ephemeral nature of the concept of postmodernism, I 
proceed with an analysis that, in a simple sense, argues that postmodern 
elements of contemporary media defy and challenge traditional media in 
a way that is worthy of analysis, especially when it comes to representa-
tions of race. Perhaps more significantly, I’ll argue that the impact of the 
social media critique becomes more profound as it generates coverage by 
traditional media outlets and reaches larger (and older) audiences. That 
was particularly true of the social media posts following Michael Brown’s 
shooting, an event that—along with other high-profile killings of Black 
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men by White police officers—launched a series of protests across the 
United States that continued into 2015. Within six weeks of the shoot-
ing, the phrase #IfTheyGunnedMeDown was used on Twitter more than 
168,000 times (Vega, 2014), prompting The New York Times to com-
ment, “The speed with which the shooting of Mr. Brown has resonated 
on social media has helped propel and transform a local shooting into a 
national cause” (Vega, 2014).
The power of Black Twitter, a collective of African American Twitter 
users who function as a kind of “media response team” (Vega, 2014), is 
a function of the fact that young African Americans use Twitter at a rate 
much higher than Whites (Pew Research Center 2014). Generally, the 
news coverage of the Michael Brown shooting was consistent with the 
kind of stereotypical coverage vilified by cultural studies scholars; Brown 
was just another Black criminal, and White officials provided a com-
monsense explanation of the shooting. But in its coverage of the hashtag 
campaign, The New York Times addressed issues of media representations 
that typically go uncovered. The Times interviewed a 32-year-old blogger 
who said news photographs in stories that involved African American 
men often “removed context from a situation” (Vega, 2014). The news-
paper also reported on another young Black man who had posted his own 
#IfTheyGunnedMeDown photos and noted that Black victims are “por-
trayed as if they deserved it, cop versus robbers, good guys versus black 
guys” (Vega, 2014). A 19-year-old student told the Times that the Black 
social media movement deserved to be taken seriously: “Hashtag activism 
is activism . . . We might be tweeting from a couch, but we’re also getting 
up and doing the work that needs to be done” (Vega, 2014).
The #IfTheyGunnedMeDown campaign quickly reached hundreds 
of thousands of social media users, and a much larger audience as 
coverage of the campaign exploded. Many major national news organi-
zation—including The New York Times, USA Today, The Washington 
Post, The Christian Science Monitor, The Los Angeles Times, Time 
magazine, and NPR—featured extensive coverage of the campaign, 
including multiple examples of the #IfTheyGunnedMeDown postings. 
Washington Post reporter Soraya Nadia McDonald suggested that the 
campaign questioned
if it’s possible for people, especially young black men, to live their 
lives online without worry that an innocent photo of them gettin’ 
gully at a party will somehow become appropriate as evidence 
of black thuggery . . . The hashtag asks if black teens have the 
same right as others to make mistakes—to do dumb things and 
post then post about it on Facebook or clown around with their 
friends—without becoming branded in perpetuity. 
(2014)
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In its coverage, National Public Radio sought out young people who had 
tweeted #IfTheyGunnedMeDown photos:
There’s that ambiguous “they” in the hashtag, and we asked 
the tweeters who, in their minds, it referred to. Generally they 
said it referred to those with power and authority—in particu-
lar the police and the media. “But it could have been directed 
to anyone who is small-minded enough to fear a young black 
person automatically if it’s nighttime, if he’s wearing a hoodie, 
if his music is too loud, or if he’s reaching for his wallet,” said 
Brianna Chevonne. “It can apply to anyone of any race who is 
ignorant enough to be fearful of young black people to the point 
they would take their lives.” 
(NPR Staff, 2014)
The hashtag campaign was also covered in Europe. The BBC ended its 
story this way: “The hashtag has proved wildly popular and been used 
more than 100,000 times in the last 24 hours. ‘#IfTheyGunnedMeDown 
Tweets should be required reading in every journalism class in America,’ 
said one commentator” (BBC Trending, 2014).
Six months after Michael Brown’s death, the hashtag had been used 
on social media sites more than two million times. It had inspired a 
mural at the Center for Civil and Human Rights in Atlanta and at least 
two songs, extending its impact outside of traditional media. Other 
hashtag campaigns that surfaced amid the Ferguson protests also mer-
ited national coverage. CNN, ABC, The Washington Post, USA Today, 
the BBC, and other major news organizations reported on 300,000-plus 
posts with the hashtag #CrimingWhileWhite, which told the stories of 
young White people who recognized their privileged treatment from 
police that would have been unlikely had they been Black. The posts 
described things such as “When I was 22 I pushed a cop when I was 
drunk at a bar. I was told to go home and sleep it off” and “Pulled 
over in high school. Black friend searched & asked if he has dope—Cop 
tells me I must be lost & to get home” (Williams, 2014). Although gen-
erally intended as an important acknowledgement of White privilege, 
some African Americans took offense. As one wrote, “#WhitePrivilege 
is being able to use a hashtag to admit to committing crimes and being 
applauded for bravery” (Williams, 2014).
Similarly, when riots broke out at a pumpkin festival in Keene, New 
Hampshire two months after the Michael Brown shooting, the hashtag 
#pumpkinfest was used to highlight the differences in the news cover-
age (and the treatment by police) of the White rioters. One post, labeled 
“Your media guide to the difference between #Ferguson and #pump-
kinfest,” included photos from each event, with the Ferguson protestors 
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labeled “thugs, animals, destroying their community” and the Keene rioters 
“rowdy, mischief, booze filled revelers” (Kleeman, 2014). But the #pump-
kinfest campaign received less news coverage, thereby limiting its impact.
The substantial coverage of the #IfTheyGunnedMeDown campaign by 
traditional news organizations is a sign that those organizations recog-
nize the significance of hashtag activism. Perhaps those organizations may 
begin to address journalistic conventions that continue to marginalize 
Black and Brown men, and will consider alternative approaches to cover 
violent crime. As the #IfTheyGunnedMeDown activists have succinctly 
observed, journalism has failed the poor communities in which violence 
and police violence thrive. Crimes in those communities are generally 
covered as singular events without history, without context. Coverage 
of the roots of that behavior—failed economic policies, disastrous public 
education, substance abuse, racism—is not part of the journalistic rou-
tine and gets only sporadic attention. Is it possible that journalism will 
acknowledge this weakness and more effectively provide coverage that 
helps explain the crises in America’s poorest communities? Probably not. 
As I pessimistically observed 20 years ago,
America’s racial myths—rooted in the nescience of hundreds of 
years of White supremacy—endure despite the best intentions 
of the news media. It may well be that the very nature of those 
media—and of the society in which they exist—may not allow 
them to function in a manner that will contribute to more accu-
rate portrayals of life outside of the mainstream. That would 
require newsroom process and social forces to be systematically 
questioned and altered. 
(Campbell, 1995, pp. 135–136)
Race and Postmodern Media
So the real hope for the media’s ability to address police violence and 
other forms of contemporary racism may not be in traditional journal-
ism but in the postmodern efforts of hashtag activists and other forms 
of non-news media, what Katz (1992) described as the New News. 
Postmodern media addressing race in a more complicated way than tradi-
tional journalism include websites such as Buzzfeed (see “If Black people 
said the stuff White people say”), films such as 2014’s Dear White People 
(based on a social media site examining the “micro-aggressions” of con-
temporary racism), and cable television programs such as the Comedy 
Channel’s The Daily Show (with its “Senior Black Correspondent”) and 
The Nightly Show with Larry Wilmore (once The Daily Show’s Senior 
Black Correspondent). Prime time network television in 2015—e.g., 
Blackish and Fresh Off the Boat—has shown an inclination to address 
C H R I S T O P H E R  P.  C A M P B E L L
206
race in new ways. Even the popular ABC drama Scandal, which through-
out its run had adopted a post-racial stance in which the African American 
star’s race was rarely addressed, aired an episode in March of 2015 in 
which the Ferguson episode was fictionally recreated a few blocks from 
the White House. On HBO’s Last Week Tonight with John Oliver the 
week after the Michael Brown shooting, the satirist delivered a stinging 
15 minute diatribe ridiculing the racist police response, the militarization 
of police forces in Ferguson and elsewhere and, indirectly, the traditional 
news media’s “neutral” approach to the events in which White authority 
figures are cited to provide “balance” to a story in which the racist behav-
ior of those authorities was otherwise ignored.
And postmodern media are gaining a significant foothold in American 
culture. When The Daily Show’s longtime host and executive producer 
John Stewart announced his exit from the program in February of 2015, 
The New York Times observed the role the satirist played in contem-
porary culture: “For a segment of the audience that had lost its faith in 
broadcast and print news outlets or never regarded them as sacrosanct 
in the first place, Mr. Stewart emerged a figure as trusted as Walter 
Cronkite or Edward R. Murrow” (Itzkoff, 2015). Such a comparison 
might draw guffaws from traditionalists, but it is indicative of the poten-
tial of postmodern media to serve the role that journalists once performed 
in a democratic society, which includes explaining how race and racism 
function, notions that traditional journalism has generally been inept at 
addressing. Even President Barack Obama, in an interview with Rolling 
Stone, acknowledged Stewart’s impact:
I don’t watch a lot of TV news . . . I like  The Daily Show, so 
sometimes if I’m home late at night, I’ll catch snippets of that. 
I think Jon Stewart’s brilliant. It’s amazing to me the degree to 
which he’s able to cut through a bunch of the nonsense—for 
young people in particular, where I think he ends up having more 
credibility than a lot of more conventional news programs do. 
(Wenner, 2012)
There are no simple answers to questions about the impact postmod-
ern media might have on journalism, racial attitudes, and public policy. 
Several questions seem particularly significant: Will the problematic news 
representations of African Americans and other people of color have less 
impact in a world in which the audiences for traditional journalism are 
drying up and young people are exposed to less stereotypical news cover-
age and more complicated discussions of race in non-news media? Will 
journalists reconsider newsroom conventions that focus on crimes instead 
of crime? That is, will news organizations consider new approaches to 
the coverage of the root causes—the economic, social and educational 
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disparities that disproportionately affect African American and Latino 
communities—of the stories about violent crime that they tell on a daily 
basis? Will the efforts of hashtag activists and other voices from postmod-
ern media have an impact on public policy?
Within six months of the Michael Brown controversy in Ferguson, sev-
eral other stories about police brutality against people of color gained 
national coverage. In Cleveland, a 12-year-old African American boy 
was shot and killed by police who mistook the pellet gun he was play-
ing with for a real weapon. In New York, Eric Garner, a Black man, 
died after a police officer used a chokehold to subdue him after he was 
arrested for selling loose cigarettes at a store in Staten Island; Garner’s 
last words, “I can’t breathe,” became a rallying cry for protestors. A 
Hispanic man armed only with rocks was repeatedly shot by police offic-
ers in Pasco, Washington, and a South Asian man was hospitalized after 
being slammed to the ground by a police officer in Madison, Alabama. 
Protest marches and social media campaigns of varying impact followed 
all of these incidents. Activists called for investigations, indictments, and 
changes in police procedures.
If nothing else, the attention paid by traditional media with large audi-
ences to the social media campaigns and protests was significant, and the 
public debate seems to have expanded. The #IfTheyGunnedMeDown cam-
paign was preceded by the Occupy Wall Street movement, which also utilized 
social media to accentuate the economic disparities between the vast majority 
of Americans and the wealthiest, known as the “1 percent.” The Occupy 
protests worked to raise awareness about income inequality, which became 
a focus of widely publicized political debate in the ensuing months. But the 
likelihood of significant changes to American-style capitalism seem remote, 
and the police brutality protests, despite pithy catch phrases useful on social 
media and in street protests—Hands Up, Don’t Shoot; I Can’t Breathe; Black 
Lives Matter—may be equally ineffective at bringing about long-term changes 
to public policy and flawed journalistic coverage of the issues.
The Ferguson protests did have some tangible impacts. In February 
2015, the St. Louis Post Dispatch published an extraordinary, 14-part 
multimedia project titled “Ferguson” that examined the shooting, the 
protests, the investigation, policing, civil rights, the courts, religion, edu-
cation, the economy, and solutions. This is precisely the kind of journalism 
that is all too rare in the US, the kind that might help explain racism 
and the factors contributing to the animosity between police and minor-
ity communities. In terms of public policy, at the height of the Ferguson 
protests, President Obama requested $75 million in federal funding to 
arm local police forces with body cameras, although the efficacy of that 
approach was questioned, especially because videotape from cell phones 
that caught police misconduct in other high-profile cases didn’t have much 
of an impact (Friedman, 2014). In March 2015, a Justice Department 
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civil rights investigation concluded that the Ferguson police department 
was racially biased and “routinely” violated the constitutional rights of 
the city’s Black citizens (Horwitz, 2015), and led to the resignation of 
Ferguson’s city manager and police chief.
But some observers questioned the real impact of the #IfTheyGunned-
MeDown campaign and the related protests. The son of Malcolm X, Ilyasah 
Shabazz, opined in The New York Times that his father would have been 
“heartened by the youth-led movement taking place across the nation, and 
abroad, in response to institutional brutality.” He continued:
In a sense, his ability to boil down hard truths into strong state-
ments and catchy phrases presaged our era of hashtag activism.
But he would be the first to say that slogans aren’t action. 
They amount to nothing but a complaint filed against a system  
that does not care. In his speeches, he did not simply cry 
“Inequality!”—he demanded justice, and he laid out the steps 
necessary to achieve it. 
(2014)
Media mogul Oprah Winfrey and activist Al Sharpton also weighed in on 
the movement’s lack of focus and identifiable leadership. While promot-
ing her film Selma, which captured a pivotal moment in the civil rights 
protests of the 1960s, Winfrey commented, “I think that what can be 
gleaned from our film . . . is to really take note of the strategic intention 
required when you want real change” (Somashekhar, 2015).
Cultural critic Michael Eric Dyson questioned President Obama’s 
reaction to the Ferguson protests, noting the first African American pres-
ident’s continued role as the media’s exemplar of post-racial America. 
Rather than vilifying the horrid, racially motivated behavior of White 
police officers, according to Dyson, the president was, “vague, halting 
and sincerely noncommittal” (2015). Dyson, an African American who 
has written widely about the role of race in popular culture, continued,
Instead, [President Obama] lauded the racial progress that he said 
he had witnessed “in my own life,” substituting his life for ours, 
and signaled again how his story of advancement was ours, sug-
gesting, sadly, that the sum of our political fortunes in his presi-
dency may be lesser than the parts of our persistent suffering. 
Post-racialism in the media lives on when America’s Black president serves 
as a constant, powerful contrast to the realities of racism. The young African 
Americans who posted their photos under the #IfTheyGunnedMeDown 
hashtag may have contributed to an awakening of those realities, but the 
long-term impact of that campaign and the other anti-racism protests that 
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surfaced in 2014 remains to be seen. As the media critic/public intellectual 
Noam Chomsky observed of the Occupy Wall Street movement, “The 
Occupy tactic was a remarkably successful tactic . . . It just lighted a fire 
all over the place. People were just waiting for something to light the 
spark. And it was extremely successful, but it’s a tactic, and tactics are 
not strategies. A tactic has a half-life; it has diminishing returns” (2013).
Ultimately, the Ferguson protests and related social media campaigns 
will likely not trigger dramatic shifts in American public policy or in tra-
ditional media approaches. Local TV news audiences will continue to be 
bombarded with murder-of-the-day coverage of poor Black and Hispanic 
communities, and journalists will largely continue to ignore the context 
for the horrible realities of life in America’s most impoverished communi-
ties. Sadly, the good news may be that audiences for traditional journalism 
are rapidly shrinking, and future generations of social media-savvy audi-
ences will rely more heavily on media that have the potential to provide 
representations of people and communities of color that refute the mythi-
cal notions that have dominated news coverage for decades.
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